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MUTABILITY AND METHOD 
IN THE MARRIAGE REFERENCE
Carissima Mathen*
The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 has caused a headache for the federal gov­
ernment. Instead of resolving the issue, the Supreme Court arguably left the federal 
government2 in an even worse position. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether 
the proposed legislation3 will pass. Given the importance of the issue and the fact that 
the government decision to support same-sex marriage appears to represent a rare tri­
umph of principle over political opportunism,4 the reference’s aftermath is regret­
table.5 This article argues that the Court’s mutable analysis, combined with the gov­
ernment’s questionable choice of method, have only partially advanced the important 
social goal of arriving at a defensible definition of “marriage”. Following a brief 
overview of the reference’s history the article discusses the opinion. It then propos­
es a modest theory of reference utility against which the government’s decision to 
pursue the reference is assessed and, ultimately, found wanting.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Brunswick. Pamela Anderson provided valuable 
research assistance. Thanks to John McEvoy and Michael Plaxton for reviewing earlier drafts; and to 
Jason Kee for helpful discussion of the issue. Some of the ideas in the latter half of this article origi­
nated in “Judicial Rule-Making in Canada” (co-authored with Michael Plaxton) presented at Squaring 
the Circle: The Courts in a Democratic Canada, Centre for Canadian Studies, Mount Allison 
University (March 2003).
1 Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2004 SCC 79 [2004] SCC 79 [Marriage 
Reference', “the reference”]
2 In this article “federal government” and “government” refers to the executive branch, and 
“Parliament” refers to the legislative branch.
3 Bill C-38, An Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage for civil purposes, 1st 
Sess., 38th Pari., 2005.
4 I give the federal government full credit for accepting the discriminatory nature of the traditional def­
inition of civil marriage. Unfortunately, the government’s conviction did not quite extend to spear­
heading the initiative on its own.
5 1 fear the aftermath has been mostly negative even if ultimately the legislation fails but section 33 of 
the Charter is not used to safeguard a heterosexual definition of marriage. In other words, even if the 
marriage issue is resolved solely at the level of the common law (excepting Québec of course), on bal­
ance the Court’s opinion in the reference has not advanced the issue in a useful way.
A. The Road to the Reference
The Reference had an unusual history. Beginning in 2000, three cases were launched 
in Quebec,6 Ontario7 and British Columbia,8 arguing that the common law definition 
of marriage -  restricting it to “one man and one woman” -  violated section 15(1) of 
the Charter.9 All three claims were vindicated in the respective provincial appellate 
courts.10 In the meantime the government turned its mind to developing a legislative 
response. This in itself was significant because the federal government had never 
before engaged in sustained debate over the definition of marriage. The closest it 
came was the reflexive addition, in the 1999 Modernization o f Benefits and 
Obligations Act,11 of a provision asserting that marriage was an opposite-sex institu­
tion.12
In 2003, when the Quebec, Ontario and B.C. cases were before the provincial 
courts, Federal Minister of Justice Martin Cauchon announced that the Justice 
Committee of Parliament would conduct hearings on the issue. A discussion paper 
entitled “Marriage & Legal Recognition of Same-sex Unions” was released. 
Hearings were held across the country.13
On May 1,2003, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found the common law 
definition unconstitutional. It issued a delayed declaration of invalidity, suspending 
the order’s effect for two years. On June 10,2003, the Ontario Court of Appeal issued 
its opinion. The panel, unanimous on the section 15(1) issue, also agreed on the
6 Hendricks c. Québec (P.G.), [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (Sup. Ct.) [Hendricks (Sup. Ct.)].
7 Halpem v. Toronto (City) (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 321 (Div. Ct.) [Halpem (Div. Ct.)].
8 EGALE Canada v. Canada (A.G.) (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 122, 2001 BCSC 1365 [EGALE (Sup. 
Ct.)].
9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c .l l  [Charter],
10 Hendricks c. Québec (P.G.), [2004] R.J.Q. 851 (C.A.); Halpem v. Toronto (City) (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 
161 (C.A) [Halpem (C.A.)]; EGALE Canada v. Canada (A.G.) (2003), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, 2003 
BCCA251 [EGALE (C.A.)].
11 Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c. 12 [MOBA], MOBA, responding to such 
decisions as M. v. //., infra note 29, removed the remaining legal distinctions between same-sex and 
opposite-sex unmarried couples in federal legislation.
12 The motion affirmed “that marriage is and should remain the union of one man and one woman to 
the exclusion of all others, and that Parliament will take all necessary steps to preserve this definition 
of marriage in Canada. “ Hansard (8 June 1999) 15960.
13 Canada, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence of 34th Meeting, 37th Pari, 
2nd Sess. (8 April 2003); see also House of Commons, News Release, “Justice Committee’s Tentative 
Cross-Canada Travel Plans” (28 February 2003).
appropriate remedy.14 The Court issued an immediate declaration of invalidity,15 
meaning that gay and lesbian couples henceforth were entitled to marry in Ontario. 
Many did.16
Shortly after the Ontario Court of Appeal decision the federal government 
announced that it would not seek a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.17 
Instead the government declared its intention to legislate the effects of the B.C. and 
Ontario decisions. The federal Cabinet decided to refer to the Supreme Court three 
questions relating to federal authority to pass the legislation; the legislation’s “con­
sistency” with the Charter, and the freedom of religious officials to refuse to marry 
same-sex couples. Some months later, a fourth question was added asking whether 
the traditional definition of marriage violates the Charter.18
14 The panel in the Ontario Divisional Court split as to remedy, with only one judge endorsing the 
immediate recognition of the expanded definition. Halpem (Div. Ct.), supra note 7 at paras. 5, 93, 308.
15 Halpem (C.A.), supra note 10 at para. 156.
16 Vanessa Lu & Tonda MacCharles, “Same-sex couples rush to the altar” Toronto Star (12 June 2003) 
A01. As of this writing, more than 1000 such marriages have been performed in Ontario.
17 Kim Lunman, “Ottawa backs gay marriage: Court decisions won’t be appealed” The Globe and Mail 
(18 June 2003) A l. The Prime Minister announced that neither of the appellate decisions would be 
appealed, and the current appeal in the Quebec decision would be discontinued. After an intervener 
appealed the Quebec case anyway, the Court of Appeal released its decision in March, 2004.
18 The four questions read as follows:
1. Is the annexed Proposal for an Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for marriage 
for civil purposes within the exclusive legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada? If 
not, in what particular or particulars, and to what extent?
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, is section 1 of the proposal, which extends capacity to marry 
to persons of the same-sex, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If 
not, in what particular or particulars, and to what extent?
3. Does the freedom of religion guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms protect religious officials from being compelled to perform a marriage between 
two persons of the same-sex that is contrary to their religious beliefs?
4. Is the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes, as established by the common 
law and set out for Quebec in section 5 of the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, 
No. 1, consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? If not, in what partic­
ular or particulars and to what extent?
The operative sections of the proposed legislation were:
1. Marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others.
2. Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform mar­
riages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.
B. The Opinion
Question 1: Federalism and the balance of power
The first question asked whether the legislation fell within Parliament’s exclusive 
jurisdiction. The Court answered this question largely in the affirmative. The Court 
held that the legislation clearly pertained to “civil marriage”, for which the federal 
and provincial governments share legislative authority. Section 91(26) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, grants power over “Marriage and Divorce” to the federal 
government; section 92(27) reserves to the provinces power over “Solemnization of 
Marriage”. In a 1912 decision19 the Court held that laws affecting who may marry -  
in other words, capacity -  fell within federal, not provincial jurisdiction.
It would appear, then, that the first reference question was unnecessary (at 
least, with respect to section 1 of the draft legislation) since it sought the Court’s 
opinion on a legislative power -  determining who may marry -  that already is rec­
ognized as falling within the authority of Parliament. Why, then, did the government 
pose the question? Two reasons come to mind. First, the government did not raise the 
general issue of which level of government has the jurisdiction over capacity to 
marry; rather, it asked whether the proposed legislation was “within the exclusive 
authority of Parliament.” An affirmative answer may have been sought to mute juris­
dictional objections from the provinces. At least some such objections would mask 
resistance to the substantive change -  expanding “marriage” to include same-sex 
couples -  within the more neutral stance of protecting provincial “turf”. An unequiv­
ocal answer from the Court would complicate such attempts.20
The second reason involves not the provinces but a broader argument over the 
inviolability of certain terms within the Constitution itself. The one court which ruled 
against the Charter claim did so on an explicitly originalist21 approach to section 
91(26). In EGALE, Justice Pitfield found that the word “marriage” must be under­
stood in its historical context at the time of Confederation.22 Pitfield J. held that the
19 In Re Marriage Laws (1912), 46 S.C.R. 132.
20 This is exactly what happened. Those provinces most outspoken in defence of “traditional marriage” 
-  such as Alberta -  quickly conceded that they could not avoid the federal law. For example, the 
provinces could not use the notwithstanding clause (section 33 of the Charter), because section 33 is 
unavailable to a legislature with respect to a law that falls outside its powers. Katherine Harding, 
“Alberta plans to fight gay marriage” The Globe and Mail (10 December 2004), online: The Globe and 
Mail <http://www.globeandmail.com>.
21 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of Law (New York: Free Press, 
1990), ch.7; Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1997) at 37-47.
22 EGALE (Sup. Ct.), supra note 8 at para. 102.
term “marriage” is restricted to its common law meaning: “the union of one man and 
one woman for life, to the exclusion of all others.”23 On this basis, he found that nei­
ther Parliament nor a province has the authority to redefine the word “marriage” 
beyond its 1867 meaning. A change of this nature, he reasoned, would represent such 
a fundamental break with the constitutional’s original “intent” that it could occur 
only through amendment.
Pitfield J.’s judgment was roundly rejected in every court that bothered to 
address it.24 The Supreme Court was similarly unreceptive to the argument:
Several interveners say that the Constitution Act, 1867 effectively entrenches the 
common law definition of “marriage” as it stood in 1867... The “frozen con­
cepts” reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles of 
Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a living tree 
which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the 
realities of modem life... A large and liberal, or progressive, interpretation 
ensures the continued relevance and, indeed, legitimacy of Canada’s constituting 
document. By way of progressive interpretation our Constitution succeeds in its 
ambitious enterprise, that of structuring the exercise of power by the organs of 
the state in times vastly different from those in which it was crafted.25
The Court’s disposition of the “frozen rights” argument is important because it neu­
tralizes a potent tool in the hands of those opposed to the legislation. It can be 
assumed that those relying on a notion of frozen rights realize that they are fighting 
against the tide of Canadian constitutional interpretation. Unlike the United States, 
Canadian jurisprudence has never really accepted the tenets of originalism.26 
Nonetheless, in the particular context of marriage the “frozen rights” approach has 
broader public appeal than it might, for example, in a sex equality27 or criminal law28 
case. Its appeal relates not so much to the intention of a “framer” that “marriage” be 
understood in a particular way, but to a long-standing social conception of the term
23 Hyde V. Hyde (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 at 133.
24 Halpem  (Div. Ct.), supra note 7 at paras. 104-106, LaForme J ; Halpem  (C.A.), supra note 10 at 
paras. 38-49; Hendricks (Sup. Ct.) supra note 6 at paras. 109-122.
25 Marriage Reference, paras 21-23.
26 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 1997) 15-45; Reference Re 
s. 94(2) o f Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [M otor Vehicle Reference].
21 Edwards v. Attorney-General fo r  Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.)
28 M otor Vehicle Reference, supra note 26.
that is thought to transcend the power of any legislature to critically redefine it.29 
The Supreme Court’s answer to Question 1 has forced opponents to recognize that, 
in law, “marriage” reflects a category of relationships rather than a spiritually invest­
ed state of being. The meaning of “marriage”, therefore, can evolve.
At the same time that the Court affirmed in Parliament a substantial degree of 
authority over marriage, it imposed on it an important limitation. Section 2 of the 
proposed legislation said: “Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of reli­
gious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their reli­
gious beliefs.” In drafting section 2 the government attempted to balance the “com­
peting” interests that may be at stake when civil marriage -  a rite often performed by 
religious officials -  is extended to gay and lesbian couples. The government argued 
that section 2 was declaratory. The Court disagreed, finding that section 2 created a 
legal exemption. Section 2 therefore was ultra vires Parliament because only the 
provinces can enact legislation affecting who may perform (or be excused from per­
forming) marriage for civil purposes.
In essence, the Court said that the provinces alone are competent to protect the 
religious freedom of persons involved in the solemnization of marriage.30 Given the 
constitutional division of legislative authority over marriage this appears to be 
straightforward. However, the federal government did not propose to control the 
duties of persons authorized by the provinces to solemnize marriage. The govern­
ment simply desired that its own legislation not be interpreted as requiring religious 
officials to perform ceremonies contrary to their beliefs.
Legislative authority regarding religious officials’ participation in marriage 
ceremonies may well be within the exclusive authority of the provinces. Nonetheless 
the Court removed an important mechanism for the federal government to demon­
strate its sensitivity31 to the tension that this issue seems to generate. The Court made 
a potentially important concession to division of powers over a more Charter-friend­
ly approach that allows either level of government to signal its support for Charter
29 Previous opinions by Court members have contained language and reasoning sympathetic to the tra­
ditional view of marriage. See particularly the decisions of Gonthier J. in Miron and La Forest J. in 
Egan. Even in M  v. H. -  a near unanimous judgment for a same-sex claimant -  the majority clarified 
that it was not dealing with marriage per se. Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 at 448-452, Gonthier 
J., dissenting; Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 535-539, La Forest J.; M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R.
3 at para. 134, Cory and Iacobucci JJ.
30 Of course, where a province fails to do so religious officials may challenge such failure under sec­
tion 2(a) of the Charter.
31 I would not restrict the availability of such mechanisms to the federal government; in a given case 
the provinces also may wish to demonstrate sensitivity. Thus, where either level of government seeks 
through legislation to indicate its support for Charter rights and values, such a message should not be 
cut down by a rigid division of powers analysis.
values.32 Of course, the government is not entitled to bolster its position through 
unconstitutional means. Still, given the Court’s relatively uncompromising stance on 
Question 3 - which removes much maneuvering room for the provinces anyway -  its 
insistence that section 2 of the legislation was not merely declaratory, but ultra vires, 
is curious. In its final remarks on this point, the Court stressed the precise wording 
of the question: whether section 2 of the proposed legislation lay within Parliament’s 
“exclusive” jurisdiction. The Court’s words suggest that perhaps the issue could have 
been characterized as having a “double aspect”.33 This approach has much to rec­
ommend it, as there is a fine line between the duties imposed on those who solem­
nize marriage within the provinces and the religious freedoms that may be implicat­
ed by the adoption of a broader definition of marriage. Such an approach is also at 
least suggested by the bifurcation of the marriage authority in the Constitution Act, 
1867. However, the Court’s ultimate disposition with respect to section 2 does not 
follow such an approach.
Critics of the legislation responded swiftly to the curtailment of section 2. The 
Official Opposition seized on this part of the opinion, claiming that the Court had 
admitted that Parliament was powerless to safeguard religious freedoms. The 
Opposition, carefully sidestepping the Court’s firm answer to Question 3, sought to 
excite public opinion using the spectre of same-sex marriage ceremonies being 
forced on unwilling religious officials.
The federal government responded by introducing in Parliament essentially the 
same legislation referred to the Court. The legislation continues to include a clause 
mentioning religious freedom.34 The federal government has explained its decision 
to retain section 2, albeit in a slightly different form, as a simple recognition that 
“religious officials are already protected by the Canadian Charter o f Rights and 
Freedoms from being compelled to perform marriages that would be contrary to their 
religious beliefs, as confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its opinion on the
32 For example, in Rothmans Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan (2003) 232 D.L.R. (4tth) 495, the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that provincial restrictions on tobacco advertising triggered the 
doctrine of paramountcy because the more lenient federal legislation was motivated by a desire to pre­
serve, to some extent, advertisers’ freedom of expression. The Supreme Court of Canada reversed, 
[2005] S.C..J. N o.l, holding that a “true” inconsistency did not arise, inter alia, because an advertiser 
could comply with both laws by following the stricter one. In its brief reasons the Supreme Court did 
not address whether a federal intent to protect Charter interests could be frustrated by a less Charter- 
sensitive provincial law governing the same behaviour.
33 Hodge v. R. (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117 (P.C.); Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 
206.
34 Section 3 of the Act reads:
3. It is recognized that officials of religious groups are free to refuse to perform mar­
riages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.
[M]arriage Reference”.35 If the legislation passes in its current form, it may repre­
sent the first time that the government has disregarded specific advice obtained 
through a reference.36
Question 2: Charter compatibility
Question 2 asked whether section 1 of the proposed legislation, which extends capac­
ity to marry to same-sex couples, is “consistent” with the Charter. At the time the 
reference was first put to the Court, Question 2 appeared to be something of an odd­
ity. It did not seem plausible that the expanded definition might actually violate the 
Charter. Indeed, the government’s choice of words suggested that it was “hedging” 
its bets by obtaining the Court’s approval without ever putting before it the key ques­
tion (ultimately, Question 4).
The strongest part of the Court’s answer related to the proposed legislation’s 
purpose and lack of discriminatory effects on religious groups. The Court found that 
section 1 of the draft legislation directly responded to the lower court findings that 
the traditional definition of marriage violates the Charter;37 and that the law’s pre­
amble stated a clear intent to honour the Charter's equality guarantee.38 The combi­
nation, the Court held, meant that the law’s purpose, “far from violating the Charter, 
flows from it”.39 It might be thought that with this statement the Court revealed its 
true posture on the issue of Charter obligation, in other words, that its answer to 
Question 4 would have been “no”. In the main, the sentiment overstates because it 
does not recognize the possibility that legislation can “flow from”, promote, or be 
inspired by the constitution without being required by it.40 I concede that the gener­
al tenor of the Reference is receptive to the legislation. Nonetheless, the answer to 
Question 2 does not settle the underlying issue of whether the concept of civil mar­
riage must include same-sex relationships.
35 Federal Department of Justice (Canada), Fact Sheet, “Civil Marriage Act” (1 February, 2005).
36 Peter Hogg notes that no government has ever disregarded a point of law established in a reference 
opinion. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 1997) at 8-17. 
It might be argued that since the federal government changed the wording of the above provision it did 
follow the Court’s advice. While I disagree with the Court’s reasoning I suspect that even the redraft­
ed section violates the spirit of the opinion.
37 Marriage Reference, supra note 1 at para. 41.
38 Marriage Reference, supra note 1 at para. 42.
39 Marriage Reference, para 43.
40 Henry P. Monaghan, “The Supreme Court 1974 Term -  Foreword: Constitutional Common Law”, 
(1975) 89 Harv. L.Rev. 1 at 2. Carissima Mathen, “Constitutional Dialogue in Canada and the United 
States” (2003) 14 N.J.C.L. 403 at 420. [Mathen]-, Michael Plaxton, “In Search of Prophylactic Rules” 
(2005) 50 McGill L.J. 127.
As noted above, few constitutional scholars questioned the constitutionality of 
section 1 of the draft legislation; yet some interveners did raise Charter-based objec­
tions. In the main these amounted to very weak arguments that the proposed legisla­
tion violated the equality rights and religious freedoms of persons opposed to same- 
sex marriage for religious reasons.41 The equality argument can only be described as 
bizarre: some interveners argued that the recognition of same-sex marriage offends 
the equality rights of persons opposed to such marriages on religious grounds and of 
opposite-sex married couples. The Court quite properly gave short shrift to such 
arguments, holding that it would be impossible to apply section 15(1) if an extension 
of equality rights diminishes the rights of individuals who oppose the extension on, 
essentially, discriminatory grounds:
The mere recognition of the equality rights of one group cannot, in itself, con­
stitute a violation of the rights of another. The promotion of Charter rights and 
values enriches our society as a whole and the furtherance of those rights cannot 
undermine the very principles the Charter was meant to foster.42
The Charter section 2(a) argument had several factors,43 but the Court focused on the 
claim of an “impermissible conflict of rights”.44 Several of the parties argued that 
expanding the definition of marriage would create such a conflict in spheres other 
than solemnization. The Court rejected the argument as both purely hypothetical and 
insufficiently appreciative of the Charter’s ability to minimize conflicts through 
proper delineation of the rights at issue.
Question 3: Same-sex marriage and religious freedom
Question 3 asked the Court to provide guidance regarding the proper balance 
between the rights of gays and lesbians to access marriage, and the freedom of reli­
gious officials (and their institutions) to refuse to perform such marriages.
As the Court noted Question 3 did not deal with the proposed legislation but 
posed a more general query. Interestingly, while the Court firmly rejected the “hypo­
thetical” argument -  raised under Question 2 -  that the legislation produced an 
impermissible conflict of rights, it did not hesitate to answer Question 3. The Court
41 Factum of the Intervener Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops paras. 52-61.
42 Marriage Reference, supra para. 46.
43 Marriage Reference, supra para. 47: “It is argued that the effect of the Proposed Act may violate 
freedom of religion in three ways: (1) the Proposed Act will have the effect of imposing a dominant 
social ethos and will thus limit the freedom to hold religious beliefs to the contrary; (2) the Proposed  
A ct will have the effect of forcing religious officials to perform same-sex marriages; and (3) the 
Proposed Act will create a “collision of rights” in spheres other than that of the solemnization of mar­
riages by religious officials.”
44 Marriage Reference, supra at paras. 50-54.
noted that the question relates to the forced performance of both religious and civil 
marriages where such ceremonies violate the official’s religious beliefs. It held that 
such compulsion emanating from the state clearly would violate section 2(a). It then 
said: “[AJbsent exceptional circumstances which we cannot at present foresee, such 
a violation could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.”45 Section 2(a) also was 
held to protect against “the compulsory use of sacred places for the celebration of 
such marriages and [from] compelled to otherwise assist in the celebration of same- 
sex marriages.”46
The Marriage Reference provides relatively robust protections for religious 
officials and institutions. This would seem to answer some objections. However, the 
legislation’s critics have continued to voice concerns premised on potential infringe­
ments of religious freedom.47 The issue has gained traction in a different yet related 
area: some civic officials indicate they will refuse on religious grounds to perform 
same-sex ceremonies. The federal Minister of Justice has urged the provinces to 
accommodate such persons, but at least two provinces -  Manitoba and Saskatchewan
-  firmly reject such accommodation on the ground that an exemption of this sort 
would run contrary to public policy.48 An additional issue has arisen with respect to 
the use of religiously affiliated spaces. A lesbian couple has brought a human rights 
complaint against the Port Coquitlam Knights of Columbus. The couple alleges that, 
after renting a wedding hall from the Knights, their agreement was terminated when 
the Knights discovered the nature of the event49 The complaint is currently before 
the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal.
About the most that can be said is that the line between protected religious 
belief and unjustified discrimination remains “murky”. The Reference opinion pro­
vides little guidance to human rights commissions -  and provincial governments -  as 
they navigate these unsettled waters.
45 Marriage Reference, supra para. 58.
46 Marriage Reference, supra para. 59.
47 Canadian Islamic Congress, News Release, 8:11 “Islamic Congress Urges Government to Dump 
Same-sex Marriage Bill: — MPs Spending Too Much Political Capital on the Issue” (7 February, 
2005); Catholic Civil Rights League, Press Release, “CCRL Calls For Free Vote On Marriage 
Legislation” (1 February 2005); Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Media Release, “Marriage 
Debate: Letter to Prime Minister from Conference of Bishops -  Freedom of Conscience and Religion 
Threatened” (15 February 2005); House o f Commons Debates, 058 (16 February 2005) at 3584 (Hon. 
Stephen Harper).
48 “Don’t give officials a licence to discriminate,” Editorial, The Globe and Mail (7 January 2005) A14.
49 Michael Valpy, “The Knights and the lesbians: Exhibit A in same-sex uproar” The Globe and Mail 
(2 February, 2005) A l.
Question 4: Same-sex marriage as an equality right
The fourth and final question asked whether the heterosexual definition of marriage 
violates the Charter. Whereas Question 2 asked whether an expanded definition of 
marriage is “consistent” with the Charter, Question 4 asked whether a particular def­
inition of marriage violates the Charter.
The Court refused to answer this question, but not on grounds asserted in pre­
vious references.50 Instead, the Court said that the Marriage Reference was attended 
by a “unique set of circumstances”51 -  if it were to find that the opposite sex defini­
tion of marriage does not offend the Charter “confusion” could result. While its opin­
ion would not affect the law in any of those provinces in which final judgments had 
issued from appellate courts, it would create an anomaly because there is no way that 
such an opinion would be perceived as other than an authoritative statement of the 
law.52 The Court was most concerned by the potential impact on those persons who, 
relying on the finality of the appellate decisions, took advantage of the new common 
law rule and got married. In the wake of a contrary opinion by the Court what would 
happen to them? With respect, the difficulty faced by such couples, while moving, is 
not a persuasive reason for refusing to answer the question. As my colleague points 
out elsewhere in this volume,53 the fact that persons may have entered into such mar­
riages has little to do with Question 4, which seeks the Court’s opinion on the con­
stitutional validity of a heterosexual definition of marriage.
As discussed below, one of the values that a reference can promote is coordi­
nation. The Court’s analysis suggests that Question 4 actually provoked a coordina­
tion problem. However, the idea that law functions primarily as a coordination mech­
anism is challenged in the federalism context, because a federalist regime can toler­
ate divergent legal rules. Therefore, the Court’s refusal to answer question 4 does not 
correct the situation of uncertainty that could be produced by a contrary opinion 
issued by another provincial appellate court. Several interveners argued forcefully 
that the principles of stare decisis and federal common law preclude this possibili­
ty.54 In other words, the government’s refusal to appeal the lower court decisions 
changed the law throughout Canada. If true, this means that a federal refusal to
50 Reference Re Same-sex Marriage, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 30; John McEvoy, “Refusing to 
Answer: The Supreme Court and the Reference Power Revisited” (2005) 54 UNB L.J. 27 at p. 28 
[McEvoy],
51 Marriage Reference at para. 64.
52 See discussion of references, infra.
53 McEvoy, supra note 50.
54 Factum of the Intervener BC Couples, paras 32-39; Factum of the Intervener EGALE at paras. 7, 18- 
23.
appeal a single decision, perhaps at the lowest court level, permanently changes the 
common law across Canada. This argument cannot be correct. In a variety of cir­
cumstances, a government respondent might prefer to appeal one case but not anoth­
er. If the time for an appeal in one jurisdiction has not expired, the mere existence of 
decisions in other, non-binding jurisdictions cannot be sufficient to deny a right to 
appeal.
Some interveners emphasized the fact that orders confirming the declaration of 
invalidity were entered on consent of the parties including the federal government.55 
Again, this does not quite make out the argument that in another case, the govern­
ment could not take a different approach. Suppose, for example, that the government 
falls. By what principle is a new government precluded from pursuing an appeal in 
a province where the issue has yet to be litigated?56
It therefore is possible that in one of the remaining provinces a court might rule 
against the putative Charter claimants. Assuming that the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear an appeal from such a decision -  and it is difficult to imagine that it would refuse
-  surely the Court would not deny that it had an independent obligation to consider 
the substantive issue (the defensibility of the common law definition of marriage).
The Court also stressed that an answer to Question 4 was unnecessary because 
the government admitted that it would proceed with the legislation regardless of 
whether the latter is constitutionally required.57 The Court apparently did not con­
sider the possibility that the government might fail in its attempt. In that case, the 
question could remain “live” as other cases wind their way through provincial courts.
By refusing to answer the fourth question, the Court contributed to the confu­
sion that immediately followed the opinion. Most significantly, the Court did not 
address the question of whether alternatives to changing the definition of marriage 
might also satisfy the Charter (the “civil unions issue”).58 Some lower courts reject­
ed this alternative, but the government evidently did not regard those decisions as 
providing enough cover for its choice of marriage over civil unions. The government, 
then, is in a poor position to argue that the key substantive equality question has been 
settled. The refusal to answer -  which an appeal would have addressed -  has encour­
55 Factum of the Intervener BC Couples, para. 40.
56 The issue remains to be decided in Alberta, New Brunswick, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. 
It has been decided in the Yukon Territory: Dunbar v. Yukon Territory, 2004 YKSC 54.
57 In addition, as my colleague notes, the Court conflated the “Attorney General” with the “Governor 
in Council”. McEvoy, supra note 50.
58 Factum of the B.C. Couples, Interveners in the Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, para. 53; Factum 
of the Intervener Working Group on Civil Unions.
aged some persons to argue that the Court left it up to Parliament59 to have the final 
say on the matter. This argument is disingenuous to the extent that it constructs the 
decision as one of parliamentary supremacy unconstrained by the Charter. But, the 
reaction is predictable.
In sum, the Marriage Reference affirmed a well-settled rule of federalism 
(Parliament has the sole authority to define “capacity to marry”); struck down a fed­
eral message affirming the religious freedom of provincial officials; made the impor­
tant but hardly ground-breaking point that extending the definition of marriage is 
“consistent” with the Charter, ruled that section 2(a) of the Charter provides almost 
complete protection from being forced as a religious official to perform, or permit to 
be celebrated, a same-sex marriage ceremony; and refused to specify whether the 
legislation is constitutionally required, after all. In its blend of evasive and highly 
assertive answers, the opinion is a model of mutability which some people described 
as a masterstroke.60 Certainly the Court was able to sidestep some of the political 
“heat” that attends this issue. In legal terms, however, the opinion hardly provides a 
stable blueprint, because it raises almost as many questions as it purports to answer.
C. The Reference as Constitutional Method
It is unfair to critique the Supreme Court opinion without also laying some of the 
blame at the federal government’s door. The marriage reference, in particular 
Question 4, was a transparent attempt to punt the issue to the Court on terms most 
palatable to the government. Perhaps, at a political level, we should admire the gov­
ernment’s chutzpah. As a matter of normative constitutional theory, however, the 
federal government should have sought resolution of the issue by appealing the 
provincial decisions, or through forthright defence of its legislation independent of 
the Court.
The reference jurisdiction is an important and distinguishing feature of 
Canadian constitutionalism. For example, it represents a key difference between 
Canada and the United States. Article III of the U.S. Constitution assigns the judici­
ary -  at the federal level at least -  a specific and exclusive function, namely, the
59 House of Commons Debates, 058 (16 February 2005) at 1545 (Hon. Stephen Harper):
“I want to take this opportunity to thank the government, or maybe, ironically, I should be thanking the 
Supreme Court of Canada for at least one thing. At long last the question of marriage has been returned 
to where it should have been from the beginning: in the Parliament of Canada.”
60 John Ibbitson, “Here’s the bottom line: The system works”, The Globe and Mail (10 December 2004) 
online: The Globe and M a il ,http://globeandmail.com>.
responsibility to decide particular “cases and controversies”.61 For that reason, 
Article III has been interpreted to prohibit the federal courts from hearing references, 
or, as they are called in the U.S., “advisory opinions”.62 Anglo-Canadian constitu­
tionalism appears to view the judiciary, at least in part, as an office of the Crown: “the 
official adviser of the executive.”63 Rather than functioning only as a “check” on the 
executive branch, it is more accurate to regard the Canadian judiciary as occasional­
ly aligned64 with the executive branch.
Note the chief difference between references and appeals. References are trig­
gered by a question from one of the other branches; they do not engage the court’s 
remedial function and are strictly advisory.65 They lack the basic character of a legal 
rule: they do not bind anyone to their result.66 In Canada, however, the notion that
61 U.S. Constitution, Art. Ill, s. 2. In addition, the U.S. Constitution provides for a “supreme court” in 
which shall be invested “the judicial power of the United States”. U.S. Const., Art.3, §1. The Canadian 
constitution contains no equivalent provision. The Supreme Court of Canada is established by a feder­
al statute, The Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.S-26, which implies that the Court could be elimi­
nated by an ordinary Act of Parliament. I recognize that there is ambiguity on this point because of sec­
tion 43 of the Constitution Act 1982, which states that a change to “the composition of the Supreme 
Court” requires a unanimous constitutional amendment.
62 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 at 362 (1911). Some state constitutions do allow for adviso­
ry opinions. However, Professor Tribe writes that even in such states the courts generally describe the 
advisory opinion as “extrajudicial” and possessed of “dramatically limited stare decisis effect.” 
Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1988) 73 n.4. See gen­
erally Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality o f Statutes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1302 (1956).
63 In re References by the Governor-General in Council (1910), 43 S.C.R. 536 at 547, aff d [1912] A.C. 
571 (P.C.).
64 Thus in the Quebec Secession Reference the Supreme Court of Canada notes that the American con­
ception of separation of powers does not find an exact corollary in Canada. Reference Re Secession o f  
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 15.
65 In Reference re Criminal Code, Justice Girouard stated that “as our advice has no legal effect, does 
not affect the rights of parties, nor the provincial decisions, and is not even binding upon us,” he had 
no objection to answering the reference. Justice Davies made the same point in Reference re 
References: “Being advisory only and not binding upon the body to whom they are given [the Governor 
General in Council] or upon the judges who give them they cannot be said to be in any way binding 
upon the judges of any of the provincial courts.” Reference Re Criminal Code (Canada), s. 873(A) 
(1910), 43 S.C.R. 434 at 436; Re References by the Governor-General in Council (1910), 43 S.C.R. 
536 at 561.
66 The non-binding nature of references, in part, explains why U.S. federal courts regard them as an 
alien function. The reference power seems to weaken the Court’s position. For example, references 
echo a theory of “coordinate construction”. Under this theory, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, while dis­
positive of the case or controversy before it, do not change the Constitution itself. The Court’s decision 
merely “binds” the parties to the dispute and the Executive insofar as it must enforce it. But, the opin­
ion has no lasting impact, nor does it “change” the constitutional text insofar as that text is interpreted 
by other branches. In pure theory terms, then, the description of the reference function meshes sur­
prisingly well with some conservative U.S. theories that seek to greatly limit the Court’s power over 
other branches. See e.g., Edwin Meese, “The Law of the Constitution” (1987) 61 Tulane Law Review 
979.
references are strictly advisory is credible only as a matter of pure constitutional the­
ory.67 In reality reference opinions have the force of law. The government has never 
regarded a reference as “mere advice”.68 In fact the Marriage Reference is one of the 
few examples in recent times where the Court takes pains to distinguish references 
from ordinary cases.
Perhaps it is natural that people pay close attention to a reference. In tone, con­
tent and reasoning they are virtually indistinguishable from cases. Compare, for 
example, the decision in the Motor Vehicle Reference69 (which struck down most 
absolute liability offences) to the judgment in Vaillancourt70 (which struck down the 
felony murder rule). Apart from the style of cause, and the formal judgment rendered 
in the latter, it is difficult to tell them apart. Whether an opinion emerges from a ref­
erence or an ordinary appeal, the Court appears to perform the same function: deter­
mine the correct scope and application of a legal rule based in part on broader prin­
ciples which themselves may require elaboration. Even if the issue is not “before” the 
Court, once the Court has “advised” the Executive of the “correct” legal answer that 
seems to settle the matter. The government is presumed to not want an unconstitu­
tional law to stand. This seems to make references just as binding, in the sense of 
having legal authority, as other cases.71
Eventually it may become necessary to reconcile references’ technical (non­
binding) status with their actual (force of law) result. In this article I will not attempt 
such reconciliation. Nonetheless, it is a good idea to consider what theory of refer­
ence utility might provide a basis forjudging decisions to put references to the Court. 
What follows is a modest attempt to articulate one such theory.
67 While in 1910 the Chief Justice implied that it was unthinkable that the Court would consider itself 
bound by its reference opinions, this is precisely what has happened. Reference Re Criminal Code, 
[1910] 43 S.C.R. 536 at 550.
68 Hogg, Constitutional Law o f Canada 8-17. The Court itself refers to reference holdings as being 
“persuasive”. Manitoba v. Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (per Martland J. referring to the Reference Re 
Legislative Authority o f the Parliament o f Canada in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54.)
69 Supra note 28.
™R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
71 Given the special nature of references it must be recognized that the federal Cabinet enjoys a par­
ticular power -  to refer questions to the Court, and treat the answer as binding -  that align the execu­
tive and the Court against the legislative branch and, indeed, against the provinces (although this latter 
concern was addressed early on in the Supreme Court Act, which now allows for provincial appeals of 
provincial advisory opinions). The risk of inappropriate alignment between the executive and judiciary 
is somewhat mitigated by the authority of either house of the legislature to refer bills to the Court. 
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 54. However, this power has fallen into disuse.
One reason to pursue references is to facilitate the development of constitu­
tional law.72 By allowing the government to obtain an authoritative pronouncement 
on an important issue quickly, references provide a form of judicial economy. Given 
that the Constitution empowers judges to lay down rules obligating members of the 
legislative and executive branches, it seems strange that courts are prohibited from 
doing so when it would be most useful, i.e. before acts are committed that might pro­
voke a “case or controversy.”73 The alleged reason for this disability is that refer­
ences may not provide a proper factual context; this is the main objection, in the 
United States, to a reference power for federal courts.74 The argument is based on 
institutional competence: the judiciary is ill-equipped75 to draft broad abstract rules 
in the absence of real cases or controversies.
The degree to which this is a valid concern depends in part on the actual ques­
tion put to the court; the concern may have some force where a reference involves 
draft legislation, or a broad question of law. On the other hand, if the reference con­
cerns a law already in force, or draft legislation that builds on an existing law; or if 
the problem giving rise to the question is well documented, a reference can allow for 
consideration of a full factual context. The Supreme Court retains normal control of 
its processes, and it can structure a reference hearing to address any factual gaps,76 
for example by appointing a m id?1 Apart from all this, if a question remains unac- 
ceptably vague, or the Court does not have sufficient information, the Court has
72 Residential Tenancies Act Reference, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714: “A constitutional reference is not a bar­
ren exercise in statutory interpretation. What is involved is an attempt to determine and give effect to 
the broad objectives and purpose of the Constitution.”
73 Oliver R Field, “The Advisory Opinion -  An Analysis” (1949) 24 Ind, L. J. 203 at 221 :
The advisory opinion has a great advantage over judicial review with respect to the time 
element, for the advisory opinion operates when a device for testing the validity of 
statutes is needed. Judicial review often operates long after it is needed, and for practi­
cal purposes, sometimes not at all. Dependent as judicial review is upon private initia­
tive in testing validity, and on common law tests of adequate interest, the ordinary 
process of judicial review is seriously inadequate to serve the real needs of the public.
74 Of course, the objection also draws on the specific wording of Article III.
75 See e.g. Cass Sunstein, “The Right to Marry”, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 76 (October, 2004) at 34.
76 Supreme Court Act, supra note 71, s. 53(6).
77 The problem is hardly unique to references. The Court has decided actual appeals on the basis of 
hypothetical situations, or admissions that eliminated the need to consider facts: Schachter v. Canada, 
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045. This does not mean that the lack of a factual 
context is of no concern, only that one cannot confine such an objection to references particularly.
asserted a right to refuse to answer it.78 So, on balance the facilitation argument 
appears reasonable; it is, at least, a potential benefit. Through references, govern­
ments can predetermine the constitutionality of legislation; and this contributes to 
efficacy and the Rule of Law.
The Marriage Reference did produce some rules that would not otherwise have 
arisen in the provincial appeals. In particular, the Court’s assessment of section 2 was 
unanticipated. As well, the Court set out a rule that strongly protects religious free­
dom. However, the opinion did not facilitate any closure on Question 4. Given that 
Question 4 represented the issue most in need of facilitation, the opinion must be 
judged correspondingly inadequate.
A second possible benefit of references is that they promote certainty and coor­
dination. This value can have particular force in a federal system, which often pro­
duces multiple and competing legal interpretations. Rather than waiting for a case to 
wend its way up to the Court -  which can produce conflicting rules in different juris­
dictions -  a reference provides speedy clarification.79 In the marriage reference, 
because the Supreme Court confirmed that Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction over 
capacity to marry -  which includes the power to define marriage to include same-sex 
couples -  the Court resolved a potential coordination problem by closing down 
provincial challenges based on a notion of shared competency over different aspects 
of marriage.80
Certainty often is elusive in Charter cases.81 However, the issue posed by
78 Marriage Reference, supra note 1 at para. 63:
“Instances where the Court has refused to answer reference questions on grounds other 
than lack of legal content tend to fall into two broad categories: (1) where the question 
is too ambiguous or imprecise to allow an accurate answer: see, e.g., Reference re Goods 
and Services Tax, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 445, at p. 485; Reference re Remuneration o f  Judges 
o f the Provincial Court o f Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 256; and 
(2) where the parties have not provided the Court with sufficient information to provide 
a complete answer: see, e.g., Reference re Authority o f Parliament in relation to the 
Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54, at pp. 75-77; Reference re Remuneration o f  Judges 
o f the Provincial Court o f Prince Edward Island, at para. 257. These categories high­
light two important considerations, but are not exhaustive.”
79 I acknowledge that under the Supreme Court Act direct appeals can be taken; references however 
allow the federal government to refer provincial as well as federal rules. Supreme Court Act, supra note 
71, s. 40(1).
80 Even if the Court had decided the issue the other way, the opinion still would have provided some 
coordination value.
81 In fairness, one should be careful to not overstate the importance of certainty in Charter cases. To 
the extent that certainty is a virtue in Charter law, it tends to be honoured more in the breach. Courts’ 
interpretation of the Charter is marked by fluidity, even ad hoc-ness. This is not always the Court’s 
fault. Even where an opinion produces a plain answer other related issues, demanding new considera­
tion, can rise.
same-sex marriage falls within a smaller class of rights cases where a clear answer 
not only can be ascertained, but is likely to hold for a long period of time and is 
unlikely to require further rule-making to determine its limits or its interaction with 
other principles or policy goals. To illustrate, while a society can agree on a law 
criminalizing sexual assault,82 it may well disagree over a myriad of issues connect­
ed to that law: disagreement, for example, over the limits of consent,83 or the rele­
vance of particular kinds of evidence,84 or the possible mitigating effect of intoxica­
tion.85 In contrast, a rule that civil marriage extends to same-sex couples is self-con­
tained. So the attempt to achieve a clear answer from the Supreme Court is, at least, 
feasible. However, while the Court’s answers to the first three questions are some­
what clear, its answer to Question 4 produced anything but clarity. For many persons, 
it remains an open question whether the Charter “really” requires same-sex mar­
riage. Given that Question 4 was most in need of a clear answer, the opinion falls 
short with respect to the certainty function.
So, on balance, the reference only partially satisfied two benefits that justify 
the reference jurisdiction. Since one cannot predict the Supreme Court’s reaction to 
a particular set of reference questions, it may be inadequate to criticize the Executive 
for what is essentially a strategic mistake. However, the Marriage Reference is sub­
ject to more robust critique as well.
The final criticism offered in this article, analyzes the Marriage Reference as 
an undesirable constitutional method. When the reference jurisdiction is abused it 
can lead to “democratic debilitation”, a term used to describe abandonment by the 
legislature or executive of any obligation to consider and apply constitutional 
norms.86 If one is concerned to keep a meaningful constitutional role for the non­
judicial branches,87 such debilitation is a serious issue.
Democratic debilitation can be self-inflicted. For example, the government 
could intentionally refer a controversial issue to the courts to avoid making a diffi­
cult decision. This is different from honestly seeking “advice” in the sense of fram­
82 R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293.
83 R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
84 R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595.
85 R. v. Daviault, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.
86 Mark Tushnet, “Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty”, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 245 (1995). Tushnet argues from a normative posi­
tion of weak judicial review. However, one need not subscribe to that theory to agree with his critique 
of democratic debilitation.
87 i have argued for just this kind of role, albeit subject to a “final word” by the Supreme Court as 
regards the meaning and scope of constitutional norms. Mathen, supra note 40 at 413.
ing options for decision-making. When one branch tries to obtain a judicial decision 
as a legitimating mark and, thereby, shut down democratic debate, a particularly 
insidious kind of debilitation results. Regrettably, that seems to best explain the gov­
ernment’s decision to initiate the Marriage Reference. Democratic debilitation quite 
blatantly occurred when the government did not pursue appeals because it had 
already decided to promote legislation in favour of the rights-claim,88 yet it still 
thrust the issue before the Court.
It is deeply concerning when the reference procedure is used by one branch to 
deliberately obtain a quasi-legal result outside of ordinary and available legal 
processes.89 Such ploys threaten inter-branch relations and cooperation. While the 
Canadian parliamentary system often produces a linked executive and legislature, the 
Marriage Reference shows how the executive advantage over the reference power 
can produce resistance to laudable law reform in an independent legislature not con­
trollable by a minority government.
If the government truly believed that an expanded definition of civil marriage 
was required by the Constitution, or would be desirable on its own terms, it should 
have presented draft legislation for debate and ratification. If the legislation failed, it 
would then be up to a different majority to try to legislate a different result. Either 
law would be subject to judicial review as appropriate. If both legislative solutions 
failed to produce majority support, the applicable common law rule would prevail.
Instead, the government implicitly set up the Supreme Court opinion to smooth 
the way for its legislation. Viewed in a broader context the Marriage Reference con­
firms the tendency of non-judicial actors to shy away from rights disputes. The 
default position we seem to have reached, is that the Court is the only “true” forum 
for discussing constitutional norms and, occasionally, achieving constitutional com­
promises. This has become a sort of modus operandi for most governments in the 
Charter era. In the long run, I believe, we will pay a heavy price for abandoning to 
courts the bulk of our moral and political reasoning. We must use the example of the 
marriage reference to demand that governments change course. The reference power 
must be used with restraint and respect. Governments must display the basic courage 
to act on their convictions. Otherwise, if the Court refuses to cooperate -  as it did 
here -  we will find ourselves adrift, with little guidance on the way forward, and our 
most important values under-promoted and unachieved.
88 M arriage Reference, supra note 1 at para. 65.
89 Martin Cauchon has admitted that the government consciously used the reference power to enlist the 
Court’s help to “sell” same-sex marriage. Oliver Moore, “Cauchon hoped Court would help Grits sell 
gay marriage” The Globe and M ail (17 January 2005) <http://www.globeandmail.com>.
